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INTRODUCTION 
Wallace Fugate was represented at his capital murder trial by attorneys 
who made no objections at trial, conducted no independent pre-trial 
investigation, hired no experts or investigators, engaged in virtually no pre-trial 
motion practice, and failed to develop and present exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence.  When questioned later about their knowledge of the law, one of 
these lawyers, who had not attended any capital defense training, was not able 
to name a single capital punishment decision rendered by the United States 
Supreme Court.  The entire trial lasted less than two days and a half days.  
Wallace Fugate was executed in Georgia in 2002. 
Unfortunately, Wallace Fugate did not suffer an unusual fate.  Accounts 
from across the country speak to pervasive inadequate representation by 
attorneys at all phases of criminal proceedings.  Failure to investigate.  Failure 
to engage in pre-trial work.  Failure to present evidence.  Failure to challenge 
unconstitutional, illegal or improper conduct.  These accounts also capture 
gross incompetence of attorneys representing the indigent.  Sleeping lawyers.  
Disciplined and criminally prosecuted lawyers.  Plainly inexperienced and 
untrained lawyers.  Even competent and well-meaning attorneys crippled by 
overwhelming workloads and the lack of resources.  These anecdotal reports 
have been corroborated year after year by reports and studies documenting the 
crisis in indigent defense programs. 
It is under these circumstances that we mark the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of a key Supreme Court decision concerning the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel: Strickland v. Washington.1  This Article, the 
first of a two-part series on the right to effective assistance of counsel, 
addresses the legacy of Strickland.2  In Part I, the Article provides a brief 
account of the Court’s effective assistance of counsel jurisprudence leading up 
to Strickland.  In Part II, the Article catalogues the widespread inadequacies in 
representation and quality of counsel.  Finally, in Part III, the Article concludes 
by discussing scholarly criticisms of Strickland and the recent shifts in the 
Court’s effective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
While the text of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides defendants the right to assistance by counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions,3
 
the real measure of help it assures defendants remained 
 
 1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 2. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 
SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
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unaddressed by the Supreme Court for over a century after the ratification of 
the Sixth Amendment in 1791.  Indeed, for much of this time, the Sixth 
Amendment was understood merely to give defendants the right to have their 
privately retained counsel assist them in criminal proceedings.4  It was not until 
the birth of the Court’s modern constitutional criminal procedure 
jurisprudence, occasioned in the 1920s and 30s perhaps by the shocking and 
terrorizing legacy of lynchings and mob trials, that the Court began to address 
defendants’ right to the meaningful assistance of counsel.5 
In Powell v. Alabama, a seminal decision involving the Scottsboro boys, 
the Court held that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated by the 
trial court’s appointment of counsel in such a manner as to preclude counsel 
from providing “effective and substantial aid” to the defendants.6  While 
Powell shed some light on the Court’s understanding of the right to counsel, it 
did not provide sufficient guidance as to what measure of assistance would 
qualify as “effective.”  Nor did the Court elaborate on the duties of counsel 
when it subsequently held that the Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause gave 
indigent federal defendants the right to a court-appointed attorney.7 
Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Court began to provide greater 
guidance about the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel when it 
addressed a number of involving claims that defendants had been denied their 
 
 4. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 661 n.17 (1948) (“‘It is probably safe to say that from 
its adoption in 1791 until 1938, the right conferred on the accused by the Sixth Amendment ‘to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense’ was generally understood as meaning that in the 
Federal courts the defendant in a criminal case was entitled to be represented by counsel retained 
by him. . . .  The Sixth Amendment was not regarded as imposing on the trial judge in a Federal 
court the duty to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (There is “no general obligation on the part of the 
Government . . . to . . . retain counsel for defendants or prisoners.  The object of the [Sixth 
Amendment] was merely to secure those rights which by the ancient rules of the common law had 
been denied to them; but it was not contemplated that this should be done at the expense of the 
Government.”). 
 5. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confessions); Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (discrimination in juries); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 
(1935) (perjury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel in capital cases); Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (financially biased judge); Moore v Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) 
(mob-dominated trials).  See also Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political 
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 764 (1991) (“The vast majority of the Court’s first 
constitutional interventions in state criminal procedure involved the Jim Crow ‘justice’ Southern 
states meted out to black defendants.”); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2331, 2341 (1993) (“The meaning of due process developed rapidly between the two world 
wars.”) 
 6. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.  The Court also held that the defendant’s due process rights were 
violated by the trial court’s failure to give defendants a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel.  
Id. at 71. 
 7. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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rights to effective assistance of counsel.  For example, in Avery v. Alabama, 
the Court found no violation of Due Process in a state capital prosecution 
despite the fact that counsel had been appointed to the case a mere three days 
prior to trial and were denied a continuance to prepare for trial.8  A couple of 
years later, in Glasser v. United States, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Counsel Clause entitled all defendants in federal court to 
effective assistance by counsel and found that this right had been denied to two 
former federal prosecutors charged with conspiracy when the trial court, 
despite being aware of a potential conflict of interest, had appointed the same 
attorney to represent both co-conspirators.9 
Soon thereafter, in White v. Ragen, the Court held that a prima facie case 
of a violation of the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel had 
been established by allegations that appointed counsel failed to confer with the 
defendant until they arrived at court for the trial, refused to work on the case 
until the defendant had some money, refused to call a single witness for the 
defense and had the defendant plead guilty.10  Later that same year, in Hawk v. 
Olson, the Court similarly found that a prima facie case of a violation of the 
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel had been established by 
allegations that the defendant was provided an insufficient opportunity to 
consult with his attorneys, that the attorneys tried to intimidate the defendant 
into pleading guilty, that the attorneys did not consult with the defendant about 
his defense and then proceeded to pick the jury and elicit testimony from 
witnesses.11 
During the Warren Court years, the Court dealt with the right to effective 
assistance of counsel on a number of occasions.  In its early years, the Court 
approached the right to effective assistance of counsel in a rather restrictive 
manner.  In Michel v. Louisiana,12 the Court accepted the state court’s finding 
that one of the defendants was not denied effective assistance of counsel by his 
appointed attorney’s failure to timely file a motion to quash the indictment on 
grounds that African-Americans had been improperly excluded from serving 
on the grand jury.13  Notably, pointing to the fact that attorney was well-known 
in the community, had over fifty years of experience, and there were sound 
strategic reasons for not filing the motion to quash the indictment, the Court 
discounted the fact that the 77-year-old attorney allegedly was bedridden for 
several months because of illness.14 
 
 8. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). 
 9. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942). 
 10. White v. Ragen 324 U.S. 760 (1945). 
 11. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276–79 (1945). 
 12. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955). 
 13. Id. at 100–01. 
 14. Id. 
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During the later years of the Warren Court, the Court adopted a more 
robust view of the right to counsel.  In its seminal decision in Gideon v. 
Wainwright incorporating the right to counsel, while the Court did not 
expressly address the issue of effective assistance of counsel, it found that a 
defendant who is not provided an attorney, and therefore lacking access to the 
special skill and training of a lawyer, cannot be assured of a fair trial in the 
adversary system.15  This implied that counsel must provide clients with advice 
about substantive legal issues and the intricacies of criminal procedure and 
must serve as advocates, guiding clients in the strategic and tactical 
decisionmaking involved in the trials.16 
The Warren Court’s robust reading of the right to counsel was also 
reflected in its resolution of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 
Johnson v. United States and Ellis v. United States, the Court found both that a 
district court must provide counsel for an indigent defendant who challenges 
the district court’s certification that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 
and that such counsel must serve as an advocate for the defendant.17  Similarly, 
in Ferguson v. Georgia, the Court granted relief to a defendant alleging denial 
of his right to counsel when, pursuant to a Georgia statute that prohibited 
defendants from testifying on their behalf under oath, the trial court barred the 
attorney from questioning the defendant.18 
The Burger Court, on the other hand, while re-affirming defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance by counsel, appeared to view the right 
to counsel more restrictively.  In McMann v. Richardson, for example, the 
Court rejected the defendants’ efforts to vacate their guilty pleas on the 
grounds that, due to counsel’s mistaken advice, they had pled guilty out of fear 
that their coerced confessions might be admitted against them at trial.19  In 
doing so, the Court held that a guilty plea would be revisited only if it was 
based on something less than “reasonably competent advice.”20  The Court 
explained: 
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when 
motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends 
as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider 
counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within 
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 
 
 15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 16. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
1434, 1435 (1964). 
 17. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 
(1957). 
 18. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961). 
 19. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 761–64 (1970). 
 20. Id. at 770. 
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On the one hand, uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions; but on 
the other hand, defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective 
assistance of competent counsel. 
Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good 
sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to 
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants 
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should 
strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are 
representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.21 
That same year, in Chambers v. Maroney, the Court appeared to endorse 
the use of prejudice analysis in resolving claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.22  After Chambers’ first trial ended in a mistrial, he faced a second 
trial for which he met his appointed lawyer for the first time in a courthouse 
hallway on the morning of the trial.23  On appeal, while Chambers claimed that 
the late appearance by counsel precluded effective representation at trial, the 
only specific mistake he claimed counsel made was failure to seek suppression 
of evidence.24  In denying the defendant’s claim, the Court determined, in part, 
that the use of the evidence seized from Chambers’ home was harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt and so “the claim of prejudice from substitution of counsel 
was without substantial basis.”25  Only Justice Harlan questioned the Court’s 
apparent adoption of a prejudice requirement.26 
This is not to say that the Burger Court uniformly read the right to counsel 
restrictively.  On the contrary, while Chambers appeared to signify the Court’s 
view that an effective assistance of counsel claim ought to include some 
showing of harm to the defendant, the Court subsequently issued a number of 
opinions in which there was no such prejudice requirement.  Specifically, in a 
series of cases in which the government had interfered with defense counsel’s 
preparation or presentation of the case, the Court had granted relief without 
any showing that the defendants had been prejudiced.27  The Court similarly 
 
 21. Id. at 771. 
 22. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 270–71 (1997). 
 23. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970). 
 24. Id. at 53–54. 
 25. Id. at 54. 
 26. Id. at 60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 27. See Dripps, supra note 22, at 271–72 (discussing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 
(1976) (counsel was not permitted to consult with defendant during overnight recess); Herring v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (state statute authorized judge to dispense with closing argument 
at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (state statute requiring defendant testify 
first, or not at all, during defense case)). 
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granted relief without a showing of prejudice in a case involving counsel’s 
conflict of interest.28 
During this time, as the Court was developing its effective assistance of 
counsel jurisprudence, there were significant problems with the quality of 
representation being provided to defendants.  As a report prepared by the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 
1968 noted: 
The problem of personnel is at the root of most of the criminal justice system's 
problems.  The system cannot operate fairly unless its personnel are fair.  The 
system cannot operate swiftly and certainly unless its personnel are efficient 
and well-informed.  The system cannot make wise decisions unless its 
personnel are thoughtful.  In many places . . . more manpower is needed.  
Probably the greatest manpower need of all, in view of the increasing—and 
overdue—involvement of defense counsel in all kinds of cases, is for lawyers 
who can handle criminal cases.29 
 The National Legal Aid and Defender Association similarly concluded in a 
1973 study: 
[R]esources allocated to indigent defense services have been found grossly 
deficient in light of the needs of adequate and effective representation.  
Relatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of investigation and other 
expert assistance in their defense.  Their advocates are overburdened, 
undertrained, and underpaid, and as recent studies have shown, the poor have 
as little confidence in such advocates, who are often hand-picked by the same 
authority which pronounces their sentence, as they do in the inherent fairness 
of the American criminal justice system.30 
Chief Justice Warren Burger published an article reflecting the same 
concern. 31  He wrote: 
Whatever the legal issues or claims, the indispensable element in the trial of a 
case is a minimally adequate advocate for each litigant.  Many judges in 
general jurisdiction trial courts have stated to me that fewer than 25 percent of 
the lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified; other judges go as 
high as 75 percent.  I draw this from conversations extending over the past 
twelve to fifteen years at judicial meetings and seminars, with literally 
hundreds of judges and experienced lawyers.  It would be safer to pick a 
middle ground and accept as a working hypothesis that from one-third to one-
 
 28. See id. at 272 (discussing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)). 
 29. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 12–13 (1968). 
 30. Dripps, supra note 22, at 246 (citing NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES 
FOR THE POOR 14 (1982)). 
 31. Id. at 247 n.15 (quoting Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are 
Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 
FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973)). 
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half of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to 
render fully adequate representation.  The trial of a serious case, whether for 
damages or for infringement of civil rights, or for a criminal felony, calls for 
the kind of special skills and experience that insurance companies, for 
example, seek out to defend damage claims.32 
Judge David Bazelon, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, also wrote that “a great many—if not most—
indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment.”33  He added, “I have often been told 
that if my court were to reverse every case in which there was inadequate 
counsel, we would have to send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction.”34 
The gross deficiencies in representation by counsel continued for years.  A 
decade after the alarming articles by Chief Justice Burger and Judge Bazelon, 
Professor Norman Lefstein prepared a report for the American Bar 
Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants in 
which he reviewed thirty-seven studies of indigent defense systems.35  The 
report found: 
Most of these studies were undertaken by consultants from outside the 
jurisdiction evaluated, and in virtually every instance the adequacy of funding, 
and the overall sufficiency of resources and defense services were principal 
concerns. . . .  Taken as a whole, these evaluations of defense programs, 
consisting of more than 4,000 pages of reports, present an exceedingly 
depressing picture of insufficient defense financing. . . .  Regardless of whether 
the study was conducted by NLADA, a private research organization, a bar 
association, or some other group, the message was the same: more funds are 
desperately needed to hire more lawyers and support staff, to reduce excessive 
caseloads, to compensate private lawyers adequately, and to provide for a host 
of other needs.36 
It was in this crisis environment that the Court in 1984 finally expressly 
addressed the measure of assistance required of attorneys by the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.37  Writing for the majority in Strickland v. 
 
 32. Id. at 234. 
 33. Id. at 246 (citing David Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1973)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Dripps, supra note 22, at 246 (citing LEFSTEIN, supra note 30). 
 36. Id. 
 37. The following year, the Court addressed defendants’ right to effective assistance of 
counsel in cases that are resolved by pleas rather than proceeding to trial.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52 (1985).  In Hill, the Court determined that while the Strickland v. Washington test 
was developed in the contexts of trials, the same two-part analysis was applicable to plea cases.  
Id. at 58.  While the first prong was the same in both contexts—counsel had to provide 
reasonably competent assistance, the prejudice prong was slightly different:  “[I]n order to satisfy 
the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
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Washington, Justice O’Connor articulated a two-prong test for evaluating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that required a defendant to 
demonstrate both that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness”38 and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”39  While the Court acknowledged the importance of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court stressed that the 
purpose of the right was to ensure a fair trial.40  As such, the Court concluded 
that the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”41 
As to the first prong of the test, the Court refused to go beyond a standard 
of “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” in measuring attorney 
performance and rejected the categorical approach of establishing more 
specific guidelines as “not appropriate.”42  Advancing its implicit goal of 
protecting attorneys and the courts from a potential deluge of mostly meritless 
ineffective assistance claims,43 the majority emphasized that: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. . . . A 
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 
 
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”  Id. at 59. 
 38. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 694. 
 40. Id. at 685–86. 
 41. Id. at 686. Although the case under consideration had arisen out of a capital sentencing 
proceeding instead of a “trial,” the Court nevertheless applied the principle quoted above.  The 
Court decided that Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding, which had an adversarial format, 
standards governing the decision, and a role for counsel similar to counsel’s role at trial, did not 
have to be distinguished from an ordinary trial.  Id. at 686–87. 
 42. Id. at 688. While the Court mentioned that prevailing professional norms are reflected, 
for example, in the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION (1979), it stressed that these kinds of standards are only guides to 
determining what is reasonable.  Id.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (reiterating 
that ethical codes are only guides for determining “reasonable conduct”). 
 43. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney 
performance . . . would encourage proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges”; counsel’s 
performance and willingness to serve could be adversely affected; “intensive scrutiny of counsel 
and rigid requirements could dampen” counsel’s ardor and “discourage acceptance of assigned 
cases”).  See also id. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The only justification the majority itself 
provides for its proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel would encourage too many defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the 
courts with frivolous suits.”). 
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evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”44 
As to the second prong of the test, namely the requirement of prejudice, the 
Court held that it would be too easy in ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
for a defendant to show that counsel’s unreasonable performance had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.45  Yet it also would be 
too difficult for the defendant to satisfy the strict “outcome-determinative” 
standard, which required proof that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely 
than not altered the outcome of the case.46  Thus, the Court adopted a modified 
outcome-determinative standard that slightly reduced the defendant’s burden 
of proof: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”47  It defined “reasonable probability” as “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”48  Finally, the Court 
advised lower courts that, instead of necessarily deciding the performance 
prong first, they should dispose of ineffectiveness claims on the ground of 
insufficient prejudice without “grading counsel’s performance” whenever “it is 
easier” to do so.49 
 
 44. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). As if its message to the lower courts was not sufficiently 
clear, the majority reiterated only one-page later that a court: (i) “must judge the reasonableness 
of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel’s conduct”; (ii) “must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”; 
and (iii) “should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”  Id. at 
690. 
 45. Id. at 693. 
 46. Id. at 693–94.  First, the Court listed the various “strengths” of the strict outcome-
determinative standard: “it defines the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts”; “[it] reflects 
the profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings”; and “it comports with the widely 
used standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.”  Id. at 
693–94.  It then refrained, apparently quite reluctantly, from adopting this strict standard because 
“[a]n ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the 
result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate 
standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.”  Id. at 694. 
 47. Id. at 694. 
 48. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  However, unlike in the performance inquiry, a particular 
judge’s sentencing practices may not be considered in the prejudice inquiry because the 
assessment of prejudice “should not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker, 
such as unusual propensities towards harshness or leniency” but should instead “proceed on the 
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the 
standards that govern the decision.”  Id. at 695. 
 49. Id. at 697. 
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The same year the Court also decided United States v. Cronic.50  The 
defendant in Cronic had been represented at a trial on mail fraud charges by a 
young lawyer who had a real estate practice and who had never previously 
tried a case before a jury.51  This attorney had been given only twenty-five 
days to prepare the case for trial.52  Reviewing these facts, the circuit court 
concluded that Cronic had been denied effective assistance of counsel not 
because the attorney committed any identifiable errors or omissions, but 
because the attorney’s inexperience combined with his late entry into the case 
and other factors warranted an inference that his representation had been 
inadequate.53  The Supreme Court rejected this analysis and held that it was 
only the rare case in which prejudice would be inferred.54  Instead, in the 
majority of cases, the focus instead would be on whether the attorney provided 
effective “assistance.”55  In other words, the Court endorsed Strickland’s ex-
post review of an attorney’s conduct rather than adopting an ex-ante inquiry 
into the attorney’s qualifications. 
II.  A TROUBLED LEGACY: THE COURT’S FAILURE TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The twenty-five years since the Court’s decisions in Strickland and Cronic 
have failed to witness any significant improvement in the quality of 
representation being provided to indigent defendants.  On the contrary, as 
several studies have reported, indigent defense continued to remain in a state of 
crisis.56  A report prepared for the American Bar Association (ABA) just a few 
years after Strickland found that “[t]he long-term neglect and underfunding of 
indigent defense has created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in many 
states throughout the country.”57  The American Lawyer published an article 
that same year on indigent defense finding “serious problems that should 
disturb the conscience of every American concerned about equal justice.”58 
More recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants published a report concluding that “thousands of persons are 
 
 50. Id. at 648. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 648. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. For a critique of a report by the National Center for State Courts that purported to show 
that indigent defense systems were performing effectively, see Dripps, supra note 22. 
 57. RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 25 (1993).  
An earlier report by a Special Committee of the American Bar Association found that “there is 
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be.”  ABA, SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 37 (1988). 
 58. Andy Court, Is There a Crisis?, AM. LAWYER, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 47. 
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processed through America’s courts every year either with no lawyer at all or 
with a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the 
inclination to provide effective representation . . .” and that “the fundamental 
right to a lawyer . . . effectively does not exist in practice for countless people 
across the United States.”59 
The discussion below catalogues the pervasive ineffective assistance of 
counsel that marks the criminal justice system across the country.  In Section 
II.A., the Article discusses the inadequate assistance being provided at every 
stage of criminal proceedings: (1) during the plea process, (2) at trial, (3) 
during sentencing proceedings, and (4) during appellate proceedings.  In 
Section II.B., the Article discusses the quality of counsel provided to indigent 
defendants, cataloging not only the incompetence of counsel, but also the 
systemic constraints that often cripple even competent counsel: these include 
(1) sleeping counsel, (2) counsel with racist attitudes, (3) counsel with 
disciplinary or criminal problems, (4) counsel with insufficient training or 
experience, (5) counsel with crushing caseloads, and (6) counsel with grossly 
inadequate resources.  Finally, in Section II.C., the Article discusses the impact 
of these issues, focusing particularly on the impact on innocent persons, an 
issue that touches not only those who were improperly swept into the criminal 
justice system, but one that undermines the security of all citizens insofar as 
the actual perpetrators remain free to victimize others. 
A. Inadequate Assistance 
Numerous reports have documented widespread inadequacies in 
representation at trial and sentencing.  One indicator of the pervasive nature of 
the problem of inadequate representation has been the fact that these 
shortcomings have been pronounced in capital cases, the very cases in which 
one might expect better representation because of the stakes involved.  For 
example, the National Law Journal conducted an extensive study of capital 
cases in six Southern states that account for the vast majority of executions and 
found that capital trials are “more like a random flip of the coin than a delicate 
balancing of the scales” because defense counsel are too often “ill trained, 
unprepared . . . [and] grossly underpaid.”60  The study found that “capital trials 
often were completed in one to two days . . . [and] [t]he penalty phase, a 
capital trial’s most important part, usually started immediately after a guilty 
 
 59. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE iv (2004) [hereinafter 
“GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE”]. 
 60. Stephen B. Bright, The American Bar Association’s Recognition of the Sacrifice of 
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186 (1996). 
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verdict and lasted only several hours and, in at least one case, just fifteen 
minutes.”61 
An ABA study similarly found that in Tennessee attorneys failed to offer 
mitigating evidence “in approximately one-quarter of all the death sentences 
affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court since the Tennessee legislature 
promulgated its current death penalty statute.”62  A study by the Spangenberg 
Group reported that the “current practice and procedure in Tennessee regarding 
representation of indigent capital defendants falls short of virtually every 
standard explicated in the ABA’s Guidelines. . . .”63  A review of eighty death 
sentences issued in Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama and Virginia between 1997 
and 2004 found that “[i]n 73 of the 80 cases, defense lawyers gave jurors little 
or no evidence to help them decide whether the accused should live or die.  
The lawyers routinely missed myriad issues of abuse and mental deficiency, 
abject poverty and serious psychological problems.”64  As one scholar 
observed, attorneys in capital cases “are often shockingly unqualified, 
unprepared, and unsupported”65 and “the test of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Georgia is said to be whether counsel can fog a mirror.”66 
Not surprisingly, there have been similar reports of widespread inadequate 
representation in non-capital cases.  For example, a study of indigent defense 
in New York City shockingly found that attorneys missed over forty percent of 
required court appearances, made few pretrial motions and viewed plea 
bargaining cases as a goal of the system.67  The New York Times also looked at 
all 137 homicide cases in New York City that reached conclusion in 2000 and 
found that the court-appointed lawyers in nearly one-third of these cases spent 
less than one week preparing for the case.68  The Times also found that counsel 
visited the scene of the crime in less than one-third of the homicide cases and 
failed to hire a private investigator in over sixty percent of the cases.69  As 
discussed in greater length below, the problems of ineffective representation 
reflected in these accounts have arisen in every context of criminal 
 
 61. Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 329, 379 (1998). 
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prosecutions from pre-trial proceedings to trials, sentencing proceedings and 
appeals. 
1. During the Plea Process 
The problems of ineffective assistance are as prevalent in the plea process, 
which accounts for the resolution of an overwhelming majority of criminal 
cases, as in cases that go to trial.  For example, on a single day in Greene 
County, Georgia, a report found that there were 116 defendants on the trial 
calendar, of whom sixty-three were represented by the sole contract defender.70  
The report found that of the “63 defendants, the cases of 17 were continued, 
three defendants failed to appear, and of the 43 remaining cases, 42 resulted in 
pleas and one in a trial.”71  Many of the forty-two defendants who pled guilty 
were sentenced to prison.72 
As one might assume from the sheer caseload: 
During the proceedings, the contract defender exhibited little knowledge of the 
facts of the cases. For example, he did not know one client’s prior record 
before accepting a plea offer. He did not know that another client was mentally 
disabled until the client’s mother (who had also been represented by the 
contract defender that same day) provided this information to the judge.73 
The report found that the representation was so lacking that “[a]t one point in 
the proceedings, the judge warned the contract lawyer that he must do a better 
job of making contact with his clients before coming to court.”74  The 
admonishment, however, did not preclude the judge from accepting the guilty 
pleas and sentencing all forty-two defendants.75 
On another occasion in the same county, the report found that the contract 
lawyer was responsible for representing ninety-four people on the trial docket 
who cumulatively were charged with over 200 offenses, some as serious as 
murder.76  “The contract lawyer did not request any trials that day.  All 94 
cases were pled or continued. In the cases in which pleas were entered, a 
sentence was imposed without any advocacy regarding sentencing.”77 
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There have been numerous such reports of pervasive ineffective assistance 
in other jurisdictions.78  Poor representation during the plea process, for 
example, was also documented in the ABA’s recent report on indigent defense.  
The report noted that forty-two percent of indigent cases in a Mississippi 
county were resolved by a plea bargain on the first day that counsel met with 
the defendant, that is, most likely prior to any independent investigation by the 
attorney.  The same report found that counsel in another Mississippi county did 
not even meet with their clients outside of court in over eighty percent of the 
cases.79 
2. At Trial 
Numerous reports, articles in journals and newspapers have catalogued the 
shocking representation being provided to indigent defendants in state courts 
across the country.  For example, one of the attorneys who represented 
Wallace Fugate at his capital murder trial was so unfamiliar with the law that 
he was not able to name a single capital punishment decision rendered by the 
United States Supreme Court: he “had never heard of Gregg v. Georgia, the 
case that upheld the current death penalty law in Georgia, Furman v. Georgia, 
the decision that declared the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972, or any 
other case.”80  This attorney “admitted that he did not know the landmark U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, but said that was because he had never lost a death 
penalty case before.  ‘There was no reason for me to study something I didn’t 
need,’ he said.”81  Stephen Bright, the attorney representing Fugate in post-
conviction proceedings, noted that this “is much like being treated by a doctor 
who has never heard of penicillin.”82 
As one might imagine, these attorneys provided Fugate shockingly 
inadequate assistance at the trial, one that lasted less than three days.  At the 
guilt phase, the attorneys failed to make a single objection, failed to present 
critical exculpatory evidence—a manufacturing defect that made the gun 
susceptible to accidental discharge—corroborating the defendant’s claim that 
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the gun had fired accidentally, this despite the judge’s encouragement that they 
present a ballistics expert, and failed to introduce readily-available evidence 
showing key inconsistencies in the state’s case, including a prior inconsistent 
statement to the police by the sole eyewitness.83  At the penalty phase, at which 
the presentation of mitigating evidence lasted a mere twenty-seven minutes, 
the attorneys called only one out of the thirty-five suggested witnesses and 
failed to present compelling mitigating evidence, including his lack of prior 
criminal record, his military service, his service to the community, and his 
relations with friends and family.84  While at least three of the jurors submitted 
sworn affidavits that they would have rejected the death penalty had they been 
made aware of the unpresented evidence, Fugate, a carpenter by profession, 
was executed on August 16, 2002.85 
Alex Williams was represented at his capital trial by a court-appointed 
attorney who when asked, in another capital case, to name any criminal law 
decisions with which he was familiar could name only two: “Miranda and 
Dred Scott.”  Not surprisingly, this attorney failed to challenge the composition 
of the jury venire despite the fact that, while African-Americans constituted 
over half of the county’s population, they comprised less than a quarter of the 
venire.86  The attorney conducted no investigation, presented only the pretense 
of a defense and did not present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing 
hearing that therefore lasted less than fifteen minutes.87  As a result, the jury 
that sentenced Williams to death did not learn that Williams had been 
diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and had begun having 
hallucinations and hearing voices several months prior to the crime.88  Nor did 
the jury hear about the repeated physical abuse that Williams had endured: 
when he was an infant, his mother often shook him hard; when he was a 
toddler, his mother struck him with cooking utensils, sticks, branches, and the 
spiked edge of her glass shoes; when he was a young adolescent, his mother 
and grandmother frequently beat him; during this time his mother also 
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punished him with “bed restriction,” forcing him to remain on his bed for days, 
even weeks, completely isolated from others while receiving only one meal a 
day; his mother also forced him to stand naked outside of his house; and, his 
step father sexually assaulted him.89  Williams, who served sixteen years on 
death row, committed suicide in prison nine months after his death sentence 
was commuted to life imprisonment in 2002.90 
John Eldon Smith and Rebecca Machetti were sentenced to death for the 
same crime at separate trials held within a few weeks of each other.  While 
Machetti’s attorneys challenged the composition of the jury venire in state 
court, Smith’s attorneys failed to do so because they were unaware of the 
Supreme Court decision prohibiting the systematic under-representation of 
women on jury venires.  As a result, while Machetti won a new trial at which a 
properly-composed jury sentenced her to life imprisonment, Smith did not get 
relief and he was executed.91 
Judges in a Georgia county repeatedly appointed an attorney who refused 
to raise a constitutional claim regarding the systematic under-representation of 
African-Americans in jury venires solely because he did not want to offend 
potential jurors and other members of the community.  As a result, even though 
African-Americans constituted a third of the local population, several African-
American defendants were tried on capital charges before all-white juries.92 
James Messer, who was executed in Georgia in 1988, was represented by 
an attorney who made no opening statement, only cursorily cross-examined the 
state’s witnesses, made not a single objection, called no defense witnesses, and 
made a brief closing argument that emphasized the horror of the crime.93  The 
attorney’s inadequate representation continued during the sentencing phase of 
the trial when the attorney failed to present vital mitigating evidence, including 
evidence of Messer’s severe mental impairment, his military service, his 
employment history, his church attendance, and his cooperation with police.  
The attorney, moreover, repeatedly hinted to the jury that the death penalty 
was the most appropriate punishment in the case.94 
Juan Carlos Pichardo, who was convicted of murder in New York, was 
represented by court-appointed counsel who never visited him in jail prior to 
trial, meeting only in the courthouse during hearings.95  The attorney failed to 
conduct any independent investigation of the crime and failed to retain the 
services of a private investigator, limiting his efforts to speaking with members 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Bright, supra note 86, at 1839–40. 
 92. Id. at 1857. 
 93. Id. at 1859–60. 
 94. Id. at 1859–60 nn. 49–50. 
 95. Fritsch & Rohde, supra note 68. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
368 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:351 
of the defendant’s family.  As a result, he failed to interview two critical 
eyewitnesses who undermined the state’s case.96  At trial, the attorney made 
several significant missteps in cross-examining the state’s witnesses, eliciting 
damaging information, and permitted the defendant to testify without 
counseling him about the potential problems with doing so.  As a judge later 
found, the attorney demonstrated “regrettable ignorance of basic principles of 
criminal law.”97  When the case was assigned to a Legal Aid attorney for 
appeal, the trial counsel’s errors were uncovered and the defendant won a new 
trial at which he was later acquitted.98 
Pamela Perillo was tried in 1984 on capital murder charges.99  The attorney 
appointed to represent her turned out to have a close relationship to the state’s 
key witness, the co-defendant in the case.  The attorney had not only 
previously represented the state’s witness, but he had befriended her and had 
attended her wedding.100  This conflict, which was not disclosed to Perillo, 
appeared to have affected the attorney’s performance on the case—when the 
witness testified, the attorney failed to ask the witness questions that would 
undermine her credibility or expose ulterior motives for testifying.101  While 
Perillo was denied relief in both state and federal courts, the federal court 
reopened the case after the attorney faced disciplinary charges for lying to 
another client and in connection with which the attorney reportedly said that 
“there are times you cannot be truthful with a client.”102  After Perillo was 
granted relief by the federal court, the district attorney chose not to pursue the 
death penalty and Perillo pled guilty to a lesser charge.103 
3. At Sentencing 
In addition to inadequate assistance at trial, there have also been 
widespread accounts of inadequate representation in sentencing proceedings.  
For example, Billy Mitchell, who was executed in Georgia in 1987, was 
represented by an attorney who failed to investigate and present any mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing proceeding.  Instead, the attorney decided to forgo 
any inquiry into mitigating evidence because he thought that he held an “ace in 
the hole,” an unproven legal theory about the nature of the notice required 
regarding aggravating factors, a theory later rejected by the court.  The post-
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conviction record revealed that had the trial attorney conducted an 
investigation, he would have found numerous compelling witnesses willing to 
testify in addition to relatives and friends, including a former prosecutor, a city 
council member, a professional football player, a bank vice president, and 
several teachers and coaches.104  These witnesses would have provided 
compelling mitigating evidence.  Mitchell, who grew up in economically 
challenging circumstances, took care of eleven siblings while his mother 
worked and, even before going to high school, worked to help support his 
family.  Despite these challenges, he did well at school, serving as the captain 
of the football team, as a boy scout and as a member of the student council.  
After his parents divorced when he was sixteen, Mitchell got into trouble, 
attempting a robbery.  During the six-month incarceration for this offense, 
Mitchell suffered repeated homosexual rape.  The severe depression that 
resulted from this repeated brutalization led to significant physical and 
behavioral changes, culminating in a convenience-store robbery and killing 
soon after his release.105 
Horace Dunkins was sentenced to death in Alabama despite his attorney’s 
failure to investigate and present evidence about his mental retardation.  After 
learning about Dunkins’ mental retardation from newspaper reports after trial, 
one juror said she would not have voted for the death penalty had she been 
made aware of this information at the time of the trial.  Dunkins was 
executed.106 
Gary Etheridge, who was convicted of capital murder in Texas, was 
represented at trial by court-appointed counsel who presented no argument or 
evidence in the punishment phase of the trial.  Had trial counsel conducted an 
adequate investigation, he would have found a wealth of mitigating evidence.  
For instance, growing up, Etheridge had been abused by his drunken father, 
had witnessed his mother’s suicide attempts and drug dependence, had suffered 
a head injury, and had been hospitalized after being raped by his older brother.  
Etheridge had been raped again as an adult while serving an unrelated prison 
sentence.  Finally, a psychological evaluation had concluded that, unless 
Etheridge was under “states of extreme provocation or intoxication,” there was 
no significant risk of future dangerousness.  Etheridge was executed in 2002.107 
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Paul Colella, who was sentenced to death in Texas in 1992, was 
represented at trial by a court-appointed attorney who had never before 
represented a capital defendant.108  The inexperience of the attorney, who was 
meagerly compensated and denied co-counsel, became all too evident at the 
penalty phase of the trial when he repeatedly invoked rules of evidence that did 
not apply to capital sentencing proceedings.109  In addition, although he was 
aware of Colella’s history of mental illness, the attorney neither investigated 
this history nor requested the court for expert assistance.110  Had the attorney 
conducted an investigation, he would have also uncovered other mitigating 
evidence, such as the fact that Colella had been raised in abject poverty, had 
been in classes for the emotionally disabled since the beginning of his 
education, had attempted suicide several times before he was ten years old, and 
had brain damage.111 
In addition, Kenneth Ransom’s court-appointed attorney failed to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.112  Had the attorney conducted 
even a minimal investigation and collected government child welfare records, 
he would have received a 500-page file that documented how Ransom had 
been taken away from his mother because of constant physical abuse, which 
included whippings with extension cords that left permanent U-shaped bruises 
on his back and limbs.113  Ransom was executed in 1997. 
Similarly, Joseph Stanley Faulder’s court-appointed attorney also failed to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.114  The attorney testified that he 
failed to do so because he did not know that Texas procedure allowed for the 
presentation of such evidence at sentencing.115  Had the attorney conducted an 
investigation, he would have found that Faulder had suffered brain damage 
after falling out of a moving car as a child, an accident that split open his head 
on both sides.116  The attorney also would have found additional mitigating 
evidence of good conduct in prison, good relationships with family, friends and 
employers and evidence that he had saved the life of an accident victim by 
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driving her to the hospital in the middle of a blizzard.117  Faulder was executed 
in 1999. 
Jesus Romero’s court-appointed attorney likewise did not investigate or 
present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.118  Instead, the attorney only 
made the following argument to the jury: “You are an extremely intelligent 
jury.  You’ve got that man’s life in your hands.  You can take it or not.  That’s 
all I have to say.” 119  The jury, not surprisingly sentenced Romero to death and 
he was executed in 1992.  Had the attorney conducted an investigation into 
mitigating evidence, he would have found evidence of a violent, abusive 
childhood and Romero’s intoxication at the time of the crime.120 
Aubrey Dennis Adams’ trial attorney failed to object to the trial judge’s 
repeated instructions to the jury that the sentencing determination was not their 
responsibility and was not on their consciences or on their shoulders, because 
the judge could do whatever he wanted.121  This instruction, given ten times to 
the jury, was erroneous because although Florida statutes permitted the judge 
to override the jury’s sentencing recommendation, the instruction stated that 
the jury was considered the “conscience of the community” and that its views 
had to be given great weight by the judge.122  Adams’ attorney also failed to 
raise the issue on appeal.  As a result of his attorney’s inaction, Adams was 
denied relief and was executed despite the fact that the instructions were 
constitutionally impermissible.123 
Lawrence Branch, sentenced to death in Mississippi, was represented by an 
attorney who did not present vital evidence of mental retardation.  The attorney 
“had been given a report that showed his client was diagnosed as mentally 
retarded at age 5, with an IQ of 68.  The report also showed that Branch had 
flunked three grades in school.  His lawyer threw away the report, thinking it 
wasn’t relevant.”124 
Robin Lovitt was represented on appeal by Kenneth Starr, the former 
Solicitor General and Independent Counsel, and his death sentence was 
commuted to life without parole by Governor Warner on the eve of 
execution.125  At trial, Lovitt had been represented by attorneys who failed to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.  Had the attorneys investigated 
their client’s background, “they would have discovered a nightmare.  Lovitt’s 
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parents were drug dealers who beat their kids, forced them to help package and 
distribute narcotics, and had wild parties during which guests took turns 
molesting the children.”126 
4. In Appellate Proceedings 
The problems of inadequate representation at trial and sentencing have also 
been reported in the context of appeals.  For example, Larry Gene Heath’s 
appellate counsel filed a brief in the Alabama Supreme Court that included 
only a single page of argument, distinguishing the sole case it cited.  The 
attorney, who failed to appear at oral argument in the Alabama Supreme Court, 
had filed a six-page brief on the same issue in the lower appellate court.  As the 
court of appeals later found, the attorney could have raised several meritorious 
claims about the trial judge’s denial of a change of venue, his denial of sixty-
seven challenges for cause of potential jurors, and his failure to prohibit the 
prosecutor from making adverse inferences about Heath’s assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  These claims notwithstanding, Heath was executed in 
1992 after the court of appeals found the representation to not be prejudicial.127 
There have also been numerous accounts of attorneys appointed to 
represent indigent defendants in post-conviction proceedings who have 
provided inadequate representation.  In Florida, a Florida Supreme Court 
justice said that court-appointed private attorneys in post-conviction 
proceedings have provided “the worst lawyering I’ve seen.”128  The justice 
noted that some of these attorneys “have little or no experience in death 
penalty cases,” do not raise the right issues, are unable to respond to questions 
at oral argument, are unfamiliar with what the record shows, and lack a good 
understanding of death penalty jurisprudence.129  The justice noted that this 
poor lawyering contributed to judicial inefficiency. 
[These lawyers] allege 10 issues or more, sometimes 20 issues.  They take a 
shotgun approach.  Of those 20 issues, 19 are totally baseless.  For us to wade 
through the morass of baseless claims takes a lot of work for the justices and 
eventually leads to a lot of inefficiencies in the process. . . . That takes a lot of 
time that we can be spending on civil cases, on other criminal cases on 
important issues.130 
Claims of inadequate representation in post-conviction proceedings have 
been well-documented in Texas.  Toronto Patterson, for example, was a 
juvenile when charged with capital murder in Texas and was represented by an 
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attorney who filed a mere six-page petition on his behalf.131  The attorney 
raised no extra-record claims, presented no extra-record materials, failed to 
raise Patterson’s juvenile status, and did not file a motion for discovery.132  
Nevertheless, Patterson was executed in 2002. 
Napoleon Beazley, who similarly had been convicted of a crime committed 
while he was a juvenile, was appointed a former law clerk of the appellate 
court who had never represented a death row client and one who had never 
represented any client at all.133  This lawyer was appointed for Beazley at a 
time when the Board of Directors of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers’ 
Association had adopted a resolution encouraging its members not to seek 
appointment to capital cases because the state habeas system had been 
rendered a “meaningless farce” by the appellate court.134  The lawyer 
appointed to Beazley’s case was appointed to six capital cases within three 
days of leaving his position at the appellate court.135  The factual investigation 
that was done in Beazley’s case—a mere eighteen hours worth—occurred 
within two weeks of the filing date.136  Records indicate that the attorney read 
the investigator’s reports—the only factual investigation in the case—on the 
same day that he also did “final preparation of [the] writ application.”137 
The petition for writ of habeas corpus contained only four record-based 
claims, two of which were repeated from the direct appeal.138  The state did not 
bother to reply to the record-based claims.139  Had the state habeas lawyer 
conducted any meaningful investigation, nine available issues could have been 
discovered and raised in the initial petition.  For example, one of the jurors in 
the all white jury who harbored deep racial prejudice against blacks stated one 
juror appeared to have been a long-time employee of one of the victim’s 
business partners, a fact not revealed during jury selection. 140  Counsel also 
missed the state’s suppression of evidence favorable to Beazley regarding the 
testimony of his co-defendants.141  The prosecution had denied the existence of 
a plea agreement with the two co-defendants in the case and had allowed them 
to falsely testify at trial.  The district attorney’s office had agreed that they 
would not pursue the death penalty against the co-defendants in exchange for 
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their testimony against Beazley.142  In affidavits, both co-defendants admitted 
to lying at trial and stated that they had been told to “make Napoleon look as 
bad” as possible to the jury.143  They further swore that Beazley had not 
actually planned the crime beforehand and had been extremely remorseful after 
the crime.144  The false testimony of these two contributed greatly to the jury’s 
finding of Beazley’s “future dangerousness,” a requirement for a death 
sentence in Texas.145  This finding otherwise had little or no support.  
Mitigation witnesses, including church members, teachers, fellow students and 
other members of the community described a respectful, decent teenager 
whose involvement in this crime seemed completely out of character.146  
Beazley was executed in 2002.147 
The appointment of a former court clerk in Beazley’s case was not an 
isolated phenomenon.  Rather, a study found that Texas judges often appointed 
counsel for indigent defendants who were personal friends, law school friends, 
campaign contributors or attorneys who the judges were aware needed the 
cases for income.148  Moreover, nearly half of the judges reported that their 
peers sometimes appointed counsel who had a reputation for moving cases, 
irrespective of the quality of representation they provided.149  Finally, over 
two-thirds of judges in Texas reported that their court coordinators—which is a 
case manager position requiring no legal training—sometimes influenced their 
appointment decisions. 150 
B. Deficient Counsel 
The problems of inadequate representation noted above are exacerbated by 
the nature of counsel being appointed to represent indigent defendants.151  A 
review of death cases in Virginia, Alabama and Mississippi by McClatchy 
Newspapers found that “poor legal representation is a result of official policy.  
The states pay no more than a pittance to help lawyers defend their clients, and 
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none requires that well-trained attorneys handle death cases.”152  As one 
observer noted: 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated what level of competence is 
required to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, instead inviting 
state and local bar associations to come up with their own standards.  But the 
local bars have been notoriously unwilling to challenge the performance of 
their bad-egg members.153 
Consider, for example, the case of Gregory Wilson.  The judge presiding 
over Wilson’s capital trial had difficulty finding a lawyer willing to represent 
Wilson because a Kentucky statute limited compensation for defense counsel 
in capital cases to $2,500.154  The judge ultimately posted a notice in the 
courthouse asking any member of the bar to take the case, pleading “PLEASE 
HELP.  DESPERATE.”  Two attorneys responded to the notice and both were 
appointed to represent Wilson.  There were troubling signs from the outset.  
The contact telephone number that lead counsel gave to Wilson turned out to 
be that for a local bar.  The lawyer, who did not have an office, practiced out of 
his home, in a setting not unlike the bar—in plain sight, he displayed a 
Budweiser beer sign.  This home office had been the target of a recent police 
search, one that had led to the discovery of stolen property.  Nor could Wilson 
take comfort in the second attorney—he had no felony trial experience.  
Despite Wilson’s repeated requests for alternate qualified counsel, the judge 
refused and trial proceeded with these two attorneys.  As one might expect, the 
attorneys provided problematic representation.  The lead counsel was not 
present for much of the trial and cross-examined only a few witnesses, 
including one witness whose direct testimony he missed because he was out of 
the courtroom.155  Wilson was sentenced to death. 
As discussed below, Wilson’s case is not unusual.  Instead, courts have 
appointed lawyers with significant problems, ones that have often led to 
disciplinary actions or criminal charges.  Courts have also appointed attorneys 
who lacked adequate training or experience.  They have also appointed 
attorneys who lacked basic resources necessary to represent their clients or 
who were not adequately compensated.  As a result of these systemic 
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problems, courts have appointed attorneys who have been incapable of serving 
in a meaningful way as “counsel” for indigent defendants. 
1. Sleeping Attorneys 
Perhaps one of the more notorious examples of deficient counsel involves 
sleeping lawyers.156  Joe Frank Cannon, a Texas attorney known for getting 
through trials as fast as “greased lightening,” has been repeatedly appointed by 
judges to represent indigent defendants despite his propensity for falling asleep 
during trial.  Not surprisingly, ten of Cannon’s clients have been sentenced to 
death, one of the largest numbers among Texas attorneys.  During one such 
case, that of Calvin Burdine, Cannon fell asleep during the state’s case on 
several occasions.  As one might expect, Cannon’s case file contained only 
three pages of notes.  Cannon similarly slept during Carl Johnson’s capital 
trial.  While Burdine ultimately won relief in the Fifth Circuit,157 Johnson was 
executed.158 
George McFarland, who was sentenced to death in 1992, was represented 
at trial by two attorneys.159  The first, John Benn, was retained by McFarland; 
he was a 72-year-old attorney who had not tried a capital case in two decades.  
The second, Sanford Melamed, was appointed by the court.  The trouble at trial 
began fairly early on.  As a newspaper reported, “Benn began nodding off 
during jury selection and his sleeping got worse as the trial wore on.  A 
Houston Chronicle account written on one of the last days of the trial described 
Benn with his head rolled back on his shoulders, his mouth agape.”160  Benn 
later explained his sleeping by saying that he found the trial “boring.”161  
Benn’s sleepiness was arguably not offset by Melamed’s presence—not having 
tried a case before, Melamed admitted to feeling overwhelmed; in addition, he 
apparently had a poor relationship with McFarland who was suspicious of a 
lawyer appointed by the very state that sought to take his life.162 
The state’s case “lacked the pieces of evidence frequently found in capital 
murder cases”—there was no physical evidence tying McFarland to the crime 
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and there was no confession from McFarland.163  Instead, only two state 
witnesses offered testimony directly implicating McFarland.  One, 
McFarland’s nephew, testified that McFarland was carrying a lot of money in 
the days after the murder and admitted participating in the robbery with two 
other men.164  During the trial, however, it was revealed that this witness had 
been paid $900 for his CrimeStoppers tip and had received leniency in his own 
robbery case in exchange for his testimony.165  Not surprisingly, jurors appear 
to have placed more significant weight on the second witness.166  This person, 
a customer at the scene of the crime, testified that she saw McFarland commit 
the crime.  Due to the attorneys’ failure to adequately contest the state’s case, 
however, the jury was not made aware of the fact that the original description 
of the shooter was significantly different from what McFarland looked like.167  
McFarland remains on Texas’ death row. 
Sleeping attorneys do not appear to be an exclusively Southern 
phenomenon.  Dale Tippins, who was convicted on drug charges in Rockland 
County, New York, had been represented at trial by a “court-appointed 
attorney, Louis Tirelli, [who] was found to be sleeping during portions of his 
trial.”168  The court refused to apply a per se rule of ineffectiveness for sleeping 
attorneys and instead determined that the impact of counsel’s sleeping had 
been minimal169 and that counsel had provided meaningful representation.170 
2. Attorneys with Racist Attitudes 
Besides sleeping lawyers, the instances of inadequate representation have 
sometimes been intertwined with issues of attorneys’ racist attitudes.  As of 
1995, “[i]n at least five capital cases in Georgia, the accused were referred to 
with racial slurs by their own lawyers at some time during the court 
proceedings.”171  These attorneys not only perform a disservice to their clients, 
but intolerably corrupt the judicial process.  In many of these instances, the 
defendants might well have been better served if their racist attorneys had 
simply been asleep. 
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Curtis Osborne, for example, was executed in 2008172 after having been 
represented by an attorney who “barely lifted a finger to defend him.”173  The 
attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence, including mental 
health evidence, despite Osborne having borderline mental retardation and 
despite there being indicators of mental illness in the court-ordered 
competency evaluation.174  Moreover, the attorney not only “rejected 
appointment of a second attorney to help with Osborne’s defense, which the 
ABA and all serious death penalty litigators say is essential if a capital murder 
defendant is to receive a fair trial,” but allegedly decided not to spend much 
money on Osborne’s defense because he felt that “little nigger deserves the 
chair.”175 
Wilburn Dobbs, who had been sentenced to death in Georgia after a trial 
that lasted a mere three days and at which his attorney presented no mitigating 
evidence, “was referred to at his trial as ‘colored’ and ‘colored boy’ by the 
judge and defense lawyer. . . .”176  The attorney, whose grandfather was 
apparently a slave owner, “stated that he uses the word ‘nigger’ jokingly.”177  
A federal district court, describing the attorney’s views, noted that the attorney 
said that “blacks are less educated and less intelligent than whites,” and that 
“integration has led to deteriorating neighborhoods and schools.” The attorney 
also “referred to the black community in Chattanooga as ‘black boy jungle,’” 
and “strongly implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a story about 
sex in a classroom.”178 
3. Attorneys with Disciplinary or Criminal Problems 
There have been widespread reports in the literature of courts having 
appointed attorneys with significant problems, problems that have often led to 
disciplinary actions and even criminal charges.179  For example, Joe Lee Guy, 
who had served as a lookout during a robbery, was sentenced to death while 
the two defendants who actually committed the murder received life 
sentences.180  This disparate outcome is perhaps due to the attorney appointed 
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to represent Guy.  At the time he was appointed to be Guy’s counsel, this 
attorney had already been disciplined two times by the state bar.  In addition, 
he was addicted to drugs and alcohol—although he claimed to be sober at the 
time of Guy’s trial, the attorney had been an alcoholic for over fifteen years 
and had occasionally used cocaine and methamphetamines around the time of 
the trial.181  In fact, several persons who worked with the attorney on this case 
provided sworn affidavits that they personally witnessed the attorney abusing 
drugs and alcohol at the time of the trial.182  The attorney’s secretary even 
stated that she personally participated in cocaine use with the attorney as they 
were on their way to the trial.183  An investigator assisting the attorney on the 
case corroborated this account, observing that the attorney often drank 
excessively during the time of the trial and was “very drunk” in the middle of 
the penalty proceedings.184  As a result of the secretary’s reporting this matter 
to the state bar, the attorney was ordered to undergo monthly psychological 
counseling, attend Alcoholics Anonymous and/or Narcotics Anonymous, 
submit to random drug testing, and suspended his law license (although it 
permitted him to continue practicing on probationary status).185 
Guy was not the only Texas defendant to be represented by an ethically-
challenged attorney.  Henry Watkins Skinner was represented by a Texas 
attorney who had previously served as the local district attorney and who had, 
during that time, personally prosecuted Skinner for other crimes on two 
different occasions; this attorney had resigned as the local district attorney in 
the midst of an investigation into his handling of seized drug money and had 
subsequently pled guilty to a misdemeanor.186  At Jose Ernesto Medellin’s 
trial, his attorney “called no witnesses” and “[a]t the penalty phase of the trial, 
which lasted two hours, the lawyer put on only one expert witness, a 
psychologist who had never met Mr. Medellin.”187  At the time of the trial, this 
attorney “had been suspended from law practice for ethical violations.”188 
Anthony Ray Westley, who was executed in Texas during Governor 
George Bush’s administration, was represented by an attorney who was 
arrested in the courtroom during jury selection and charged with contempt of 
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court for failing to file pleadings in an earlier capital client’s appeal.189  
Frances Newton was executed in Texas in 2005 despite having been 
represented by an attorney at trial whose failure to conduct an independent 
investigation was evident from his not being able to name a single person he 
had interviewed on his client’s behalf; this attorney “has been repeatedly 
disciplined by the State Bar of Texas, and now is disqualified from handling 
capital murder cases.”190 
These accounts of indigent defendants in Texas being represented by 
attorneys who faced disciplinary action do not represent an isolated problem.  
Nearly one in four inmates on death row in Texas reportedly were represented 
by court-appointed counsel who were disciplined for professional misconduct 
at some point in their careers, a rate nearly 800% greater than the rate at which 
lawyers in Texas were generally disciplined.191  Indeed, the state bar grievance 
procedures themselves have apparently proved ineffective in protecting 
defendants from inadequate representation: at least thirteen death row inmates 
in Texas were represented in post-conviction proceedings by court-appointed 
attorneys who were publicly disciplined by the state bar and who nevertheless 
have been appointed to multiple cases and remain eligible for additional 
appointments.192 
Nor were these problems limited to capital cases in the Lone Star State.  
Georgia, for example, executed John Young in 1985 despite his having been 
represented by an attorney addicted to amphetamines and other drugs during 
trial.  Young’s attorney, moreover, was distracted at that time by difficulties 
with his marriage, child custody issues, his relationship with a lover, and his 
family business.  As a result, the physically and emotionally drained exhausted 
attorney did not adequately prepare for trial and Young was sentenced to 
death.  A few weeks after the trial, Young met the attorney in the county jail, 
not in his capacity as Young’s lawyer, but as a fellow inmate—the attorney 
had been sentenced after pleading guilty to state and federal drug charges.193 
Jeffrey Devan Leonard, who had been sentenced to death and whose 
sentence was later commuted to life without parole by the governor, had been 
represented at trial by an attorney who was “disbarred and indicted on a 
perjury charge for claiming he had handled four death-penalty cases before 
Leonard’s.  In fact, he had no experience as a lead attorney in a capital case 
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and surrendered his law license earlier this year in a deal with prosecutors that 
ended the perjury case.”194 
Defendants in other states too have been represented by attorneys facing 
disciplinary issues.  A National Law Journal study found that attorneys who 
represented death row inmates in six Southern states were disbarred, 
suspended, or otherwise disciplined at a rate that was 300% to 4,600% higher 
than the discipline rates for other lawyers in those states.195  In Illinois, about 
one out of every eight persons sentenced to death over a period of more than 
twenty years was represented by an attorney who was either disbarred or 
suspended prior to or after the trial.196  In Kentucky, twenty-five percent of 
death-row inmates were represented at trial by attorneys who have since been 
disbarred or resigned to avoid disbarment.197  In Louisiana, two out of the three 
persons executed between 1999 and 2004 were “represented by attorneys no 
longer allowed to practice law, according to the Louisiana Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel.  One of the lawyers was disbarred after being found to 
have participated in a laundry list of improper behavior involving several 
cases.  The other lost his license because of mental health problems.”198  An 
earlier study had found that thirteen percent of the defendants executed in 
Louisiana had been represented by lawyers who had been disciplined, a rate 
sixty-eight times as great as that for the state bar as a whole.”199 
In North Carolina, at least sixteen death row inmates, including three who 
were executed, were represented by attorneys who, either prior to or after their 
representation of the condemned defendants, had been disbarred or disciplined 
for unethical or criminal conduct.200  In Tennessee, at least thirty-nine lawyers, 
many of whom had been later convicted of crimes including theft, bank fraud, 
concealment of stolen money, tax evasion and obstruction of justice, had 
represented defendants in capital cases, had been disciplined by the state and 
the death sentences were affirmed in most of these cases, even where the 
misconduct was directly related to the case.201  In Washington state, about one 
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of five of the over eighty inmates who faced execution over a period of two 
decades were represented by lawyers who had been, or were later, disbarred, 
suspended or arrested, a rate more than 2,000% higher than the state’s overall 
disbarment rate for attorneys.202 
Finally, attorneys who face faced disciplinary and other significant 
problems have also been appointed to represent indigent defendants in post-
conviction proceedings.  The court-appointed attorney for Gregory Demery 
subsequently had his law license suspended for five years.203  The attorney 
filed an exceedingly brief petition on Demery’s behalf that only tenuously 
identified a single claim.  The same lawyer had been appointed to represent 
Anthony Medina in his post-conviction proceedings and filed a petition re-
writing several claims that had been previously denied on direct appeal; he also 
filed this petition late, resulting in its dismissal.204  The same lawyer also 
represented Gerald Casey in post-conviction proceedings, filing a mere eleven-
page habeas application that only raised record-based claims.205  While 
Demery and Medina remain on death row in Texas, Casey was executed in 
2002.206 
While Demery, Medina and Casey’s attorney was disciplined after being 
appointed to their cases, Leonard Rojas was appointed an attorney in post-
conviction proceedings who had already been disciplined twice and had 
received two forty-eight month probated suspensions from the practice of law 
by the Texas State Bar.207  The lawyer was still on probation at the time of his 
appointment and continuously throughout the representation of Rojas.208  His 
discipline problems included neglecting a legal matter, failing to completely 
carry out the obligations owed to his clients and having a psychological 
impairment materially impairing his fitness to represent his client.209  Fourteen 
days after being appointed to represent Rojas, the state bar disciplined the 
attorney for a third time.210  Despite these violations, counsel was deemed 
“qualified” and filed a fifteen-page petition raising thirteen claims for relief.  
All were record-based claims, twelve of which were procedurally defaulted for 
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not having been raised on direct appeal.211  Rojas was executed in Texas in 
2002.212 
4. Attorneys with Insufficient Training or Experience 
Besides representation by attorneys facing disciplinary action and criminal 
charges, there have been repeated accounts of defendants being represented by 
counsel who have inadequate training or experience.  Judges have appointed 
attorneys who have never tried a case before to represent defendants in capital 
cases.213  A study of homicide cases in Philadelphia found that judges 
appointed many attorneys to capital cases based on criteria not related to legal 
ability, such as political connections, and that the resulting quality of appointed 
attorneys was so poor that “even officials in charge of the system say they 
wouldn’t want to be represented in Traffic Court by some of the people 
appointed to defend poor people accused of murder.”214 
There have been accounts, moreover, from across the South of courts 
appointing inexperienced counsel in capital cases.  In Alabama, for example, a 
judge refused to relieve counsel even when they filed a motion to be relieved 
of the appointment because they had inadequate experience in defending 
criminal cases and considered themselves incompetent to defend a capital 
case.215  In Georgia, a newly admitted member to the bar was appointed to 
represent a capital defendant on appeal by a judge she had met two days earlier 
when she accompanied her employer to a divorce proceeding; a second 
attorney was appointed to assist only after she asked for help.216  In Louisiana, 
an attorney specializing in oil and gas work was appointed to represent a 
defendant in a capital case; it was his first criminal case of any type.217 
Ernest Willis was defended at his 1987 capital trial by two court-appointed 
attorneys, neither of who had any experience representing defendants in capital 
cases. 218  In fact, one of the attorneys had only recently stopped working for 
the district attorney who was prosecuting Willis.219  The two attorneys spent 
fewer than three hours consulting with Willis prior to trial, conducted only a 
minimal cross-examination of the state’s witnesses, and failed to call any of the 
numerous character witnesses who had been willing to testify on Willis’ 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. DAVID CARSON, TEXAS EXECUTION INFORMATION CENTER, LEONARD ROJAS (2002), 
http://txexecutions.org/reports/288.asp. 
 213. Bright, supra note 86, at 1856. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, supra note 61, at 379. 
 218. See TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL, supra note 99, at 95. 
 219. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
384 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:351 
behalf.220  Not surprisingly, the jury convicted and sentenced Willis to death.  
This was despite the fact that the state had a weak circumstantial case—even 
the district attorney had given himself no more than a ten percent chance of 
obtaining a conviction prior to the trial—with no physical evidence linking 
Willis to the crime, no eyewitnesses and no confession.221  The lead attorney in 
Willis’ case surrendered his law license in 1997 after being convicted of a 
cocaine charge and went to work as a law clerk for the district attorney in 
Willis’ case who, by this time, had moved on to private practice.222 
There have also been numerous instances in which courts have appointed 
inexperienced and unqualified attorneys to represent defendants in post-
conviction proceedings.  For example, Johnny Joe Martinez, who was executed 
in 2002, was given a court-appointed attorney who had never previously 
handled any capital post-conviction matters.223  The attorney never spoke with 
Martinez and the five-page petition he filed did not bring before the court 
reportedly compelling mitigating evidence that had been omitted at the original 
trial.224  Anthony Graves, similarly appointed counsel in Texas, had been out 
of law school for only three years.225  This attorney reportedly “failed to 
conduct an adequate investigation and missed compelling evidence of Graves’s 
innocence, including the statement of a witness who admitted he lied when he 
implicated Graves at the trial.”226  Despite the absence of any physical 
evidence linking him to the crime, and despite the fact that the witness who 
implicated Graves in the crime admitted at his own execution that Graves was 
innocent, Graves remains on death row in Texas.227 
The problem posed by the appointment of inexperienced counsel is often 
compounded by the corresponding refusal to appoint experienced counsel.  
Georgia trial judges, for example, have repeatedly refused to appoint attorneys 
in capital cases who had successfully won new trials for their clients in post-
conviction proceedings despite the fact these attorneys were experienced and 
familiar with the case.228  While the Georgia Supreme Court reversed these 
rulings in several cases, trial judges have continued this practice.229 
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5. Attorneys Overburdened with Crushing Caseloads 
The quality of representation provided to indigent defendants has also been 
undermined by the heavy workload imposed on counsel.  A public defender in 
New Orleans, for example, represented 418 defendants during a seven-month 
period, leading his clients to enter guilty pleas at the arraignment itself in 130 
cases.230  In Georgia, attorneys in the Fulton County Public Defender program, 
which serves defendants in Atlanta, were assigned an average of 530 felony 
cases every year in addition to extraditions, probation revocations, and 
commitment and special hearings.231  As a consequence, attorneys often 
resolve their client’s cases upon their very first meeting with the clients; as one 
public defender described disposing of the cases of seventeen indigent 
defendants, “I met ‘em, pled ‘em and closed ‘em—all in the same day.”232  In 
Tennessee, assistant public defenders were reported to have been handling 
close to a thousand cases a year each.233 
Some lawyers have been offended by the limitations imposed by these 
crushing workloads.  One lawyer wrote a letter in the state bar journal 
publically chronicling his own poor representation of Leslie Dale Martin, who 
was executed in Louisiana in 2002, pointing to his inexperience, his failure to 
prepare for trial and his overwhelming workload at the time.234  Many lawyers 
who have objected to this system of criminal practice, which has come to be 
known there as “slaughterhouse justice,” however, have not fared well.235  For 
example, when a lawyer, carrying a caseload of 122 despite closing 476 cases 
in ten months, asserted her ethical obligation to limit her caseload, she was 
berated by the trial judge, her request was denied and she was later demoted to 
juvenile court by the director of her office.236 
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6. Attorneys Lacking Adequate Resources 
The quality of representation provided to indigent defendants, moreover, 
has also been undermined by the failure to provide counsel necessary 
resources.  “Mounting a proper defense in a capital case requires methodical 
research; deep, probing interviews; and intricate planning and strategizing.  
The hours can stretch into the thousands; the bills easily can reach six 
figures.”237  Lack of access to proper resources, however, remains a critical 
problem.238 
A public defender in New Orleans, for example, received no investigative 
support in “routine cases” because the three investigators in the public 
defender’s office were responsible for more than 7,000 cases per year; nor 
were funds for expert assistance available to the attorney.239  An attorney 
appointed to represent a capital defendant in Alabama was granted only $500 
for expert and investigative expenses in a case where he was confronted on the 
other side with three prosecutors and an array of law enforcement agencies and 
expert witnesses.240  While the attorney later testified that he would have hired 
experts if it were a civil case because the failure to do so would have 
constituted malpractice, the $500 limit led him to forego such assistance in the 
criminal case.241  As he explained: 
Without more than $500, there was only one choice, and that is to go to the 
bank and to finance this litigation, myself, and I was just financially unable to 
do that.  It would have cost probably in excess of thirty to forty thousand 
dollars, and I just could not justify taking those funds from my practice, or my 
family at that time.242 
The quality of representation provided to indigent defendants has been 
further undermined by the failure to properly compensate appointed counsel.  
In some other instances, courts have failed to compensate indigent defense 
counsel at all.243  There have also been reports of appointed counsel not being 
paid for months or years after they provided the representation or having their 
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applications for compensation arbitrarily reduced by judges or other 
officials.244 
In many other instances, while courts have compensated attorneys, the 
rates of compensation have been dismally low.245  For example, while 
attorneys appointed to defend capital cases in Philadelphia were paid an 
average of over $6,000 per case,246
 
compensation for counsel in Alabama was 
limited to $1,000 for out-of-court work.247  As a result, two attorneys who had 
spent 246.86 and 187.90 hours respectively on out-of-court work were paid the 
equivalent of $4.05 and $5.32 per hour for their efforts.248  And, while 
compensation in Kentucky was limited to $2,500 in capital cases,249
 
lawyers in 
Mississippi capital case were only paid $1,000 dollars and reimbursed for their 
overhead expenses.250  In New Jersey, court-appointed counsel were paid $30 
per hour for in-court work and $25 per hour for out-of-court work.251  Court-
appointed lawyers in New York City were reportedly paid $40 per hour for 
work in-court and $25 per hour for work out-of-court, the second-lowest rate in 
the nation.252  While court-appointed attorneys in Tennessee non-criminal 
cases were paid up to $225 and $350 per hour, those who were appointed to 
represent capital defendants were paid only $60 to $100 per hour, depending 
on the procedural status of the case.253  Similarly, lawyers in parts of rural 
Texas received no more than $800 to handle a capital case.254  A study in 
Virginia, moreover, found that after overhead expenses were taken into 
account, the attorney representing an indigent defendant in a capital case was 
paid at an effective rate of $13 per hour.255 
Appellate counsel too are often poorly compensated.  In New York, while 
private counsel charged clients $15,000 to $50,000 for appeals, court-
appointed counsel were often paid a $1,200 standard statutory fee, permitting a 
maximum of 30 hours of work at $40 per hour.256  The court-appointed lawyer 
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representing Jovani Garcia spent about 250 hours on the appeal, and the 
resulting $1,200 paycheck amount to less than $5 per hour.257 
When attorneys have challenged these abysmally low rates of 
compensation, they have not fared well.  For example, when a lawyer in 
Georgia who had been appointed to a capital case submitted his first billing 
statement to the judge for approval, the judge told him that he was spending 
too much time on the case; the judge later summarily replaced this lawyer with 
a another one and the defendant was ultimately sentenced to death.258  In 
Virginia, where compensation in felony cases was limited to $305 in cases 
where the punishment was less than 20 years and $845 in cases where the 
punishment was more than 20 years, an attorney who challenged these limits 
was removed from the case by the circuit judge; and, another judge announced 
at calendar call that any attorney raising a similar challenge would be removed 
from the list of appointed counsel.259 
Not surprisingly, these low rates of compensation have a direct bearing on 
the quality of representation being provided to indigent defendants.  As the 
Director of the ABA’s Death Penalty Representation Project noted, “I can say 
with confidence that . . . [w]e are seeing the same kinds of egregiously bad 
lawyering that we saw 10 or 15 years ago, for a variety of reasons, including 
inadequate funding.”260  The New York Times, for example, conducted a long 
investigation into the provision and performance of appointed counsel in New 
York City and found that appointed counsel were paid at rates that actively 
discourage them from spending enough time on cases.261  One lawyer, for 
example, earned about $125,000 one year by handling sixteen hundred cases; 
due to this immense workload, he did not confer with clients, did not return 
client phone calls and did not prepare or file necessary motions, focusing 
instead on working out quick plea bargains.262  “Most good lawyers do not 
work for $4 an hour or even $20, $50 or $100 an hour.  Lawyers paid so little 
cannot afford to spend the time required to conduct interviews, investigations 
and negotiations, and defend cases at trials.”263 
As one Virginia prosecutor observed, “you get what you pay for.”264  He 
noted that when one takes a look at the list of attorneys appointed to represent 
indigent defendants, one finds very few experienced attorneys because they 
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cannot afford such work.  Instead, “you either have very inexperienced 
attorneys right out of law school for whom any money is better than no 
money . . . [o]r you have people who are really bad lawyers who can’t make a 
living except off the court appointed list.”265 
C. Consequences of Inadequate Assistance and Deficient Counsel 
The shockingly inadequate representation chronicled above represents the 
evisceration of a critical constitutional safeguard of individual liberty.  Many 
of the defendants provided deficient assistance by often deficient counsel have 
been executed.  Others, while lucky to not lose their lives, have spent long 
terms in prison.  The often disparate nature of representation provided to 
indigent defendants as compared to those who can afford the services of good 
counsel undermines faith in the fair operation of the judicial process, opening 
the door to criticism such as: 
The dream of Gideon has not been realized.  If we are not going to do 
something about this, we ought to sandblast the words “equal justice under 
law” from the front of the Supreme Court building.  And we ought to just say 
that our system of justice is like the sky box at the stadium, or membership in 
the country club—available only to people who can afford it.266 
The inadequate representation and deficient counsel have also created an 
unacceptable risk of innocent persons being convicted and sentenced.  For 
example, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, who was convicted of the brutal rape of an 
eight-year-old girl in Montana, was released after serving fifteen years in 
prison when DNA testing exonerated him.267  During the trial, Bromgard’s 
attorney, a lawyer who had contracted with the county to defend all indigent 
defendants for a flat fee, conducted no investigation, gave no opening 
statement, failed to challenge the victim’s in-court identification, failed to 
object to unfounded testimony by the state’s expert about hair evidence in the 
case, and failed to prepare a closing argument.268 
Gary Nelson, who was released after serving eleven years on death row, 
had been represented at his capital trial in Georgia by a sole practitioner who 
had never tried a capital case and who was compelled to represent Nelson by 
himself after the trial judge denied his request for co-counsel.269  This court-
appointed attorney, who was struggling with financial problems and a divorce, 
was paid at a rate of only $15 to $20 per hour and was not provided funds for 
an investigator.270 The attorney failed to effectively challenge the 
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circumstantial case against Nelson, including questionable forensic evidence, 
delivered a closing argument that was merely 255 words long, and was later 
disbarred for other reasons.271  Nelson was released when pro bono counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings discovered not only that the hair found on the 
victim’s body, which the prosecution expert had linked to Nelson, lacked 
sufficient characteristics for microscopic comparison, but that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation had previously examined the hair and found that it 
could not validly be compared.272 
Frederico Martinez-Macias, who was sentenced to death in Texas, was 
represented at his capital trial by a court-appointed attorney who was paid only 
$11.84 per hour.273  The attorney failed to present an available alibi witness, 
relied upon an incorrect assumption about a key evidentiary point without 
doing the research that would have corrected his erroneous view of the law, 
and failed to interview and present witnesses who could have rebutted the 
state’s case.274  After pro bono counsel in post-conviction proceedings properly 
investigated the case and developed facts about his innocence, Martinez-
Macias won federal habeas corpus relief; and when a grand jury refused to re-
indict him, he was released after having spent nine years on death row.275 
These anecdotal accounts do not represent isolated instances of innocent 
persons falling through the cracks.  Instead, post-conviction DNA testing has 
conclusively exonerated many defendants276
 
and a common denominator 
running through the unjust conviction cases is a shoddy defense at trial.277  The 
Innocence Project notes that “[a] review of convictions overturned by DNA 
testing reveals a trail of sleeping, drunk, incompetent and overburdened 
defense attorneys, at the trial level and on appeal.”278  This has led a scholar to 
conclude that if one had to make a single reform in the criminal justice system 
that “would do more than any other plausible policy to reduce the frequency of 
false convictions[,] . . . [t]hat reform is making sure that every defendant has 
the effective assistance of counsel.”279 
A number of Supreme Court Justices have indicated a genuine awareness 
of the role of inadequate representation has played in the cases where innocent 
persons have been convicted.  Justice John Paul Stevens observed that the 
“recent development of reliable scientific evidentiary methods has made it 
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possible to establish conclusively that a disturbing number of persons who had 
been sentenced to death were actually innocent,” a situation that Justice 
Stevens notes “most dramatically illustrate[s]” the consequences of failing to 
provide adequate representation to indigent defendants.280  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor too voiced concerns about the role of inadequate representation by 
counsel in capital cases during a 2001 speech delivered at a meeting of the 
Minnesota Women Lawyers, noting that “[a]fter 20 years on the high court, I 
have to acknowledge that serious questions are being raised about whether the 
death penalty is being fairly administered in this country.”281  She further 
added that “as the rate of executions have increased, problems in the way 
which the death penalty has been administered have become more 
apparent . . .” and that “[p]erhaps most alarming among these is the fact that if 
statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent 
defendants to be executed.”282  Earlier that year, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
voiced similar concerns about the quality of representation in supporting a 
proposed moratorium on executions in Maryland.283 
It bears noting, however, that the problem of innocent persons being 
convicted raises concerns beyond the manifest injustice done to those who 
have been wrongfully convicted and the violation of the precept that it is better 
to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one innocent person.  The 
conviction of an innocent person is accompanied by the concurrent failure to 
apprehend and convict the actual perpetrator of the crime, leaving that person 
free to commit additional crimes.  Indeed, in a large number of the cases of 
persons exonerated by DNA, the actual perpetrator went on to commit serious 
offenses, ranging from theft to assault, rape and murder.284  Moreover, the 
continued freedom experienced by the actually guilty perpetrators undermines 
the deterrence goals of criminal law.  Not only are those persons not 
individually deterred, but any third persons aware of the actual perpetrator’s 
evasion of guilt—whether they be friends, family or acquaintances—too are 
less deterred because the data shows that the single biggest factor having a 
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bearing on the deterrence value of the law is not the magnitude of the 
punishment, but the likelihood of apprehension.285 
III.  EPILOGUE 
Given the pervasive, shockingly poor representation provided by counsel, 
and the enormous toll that has exacted not only on defendants but also the 
criminal justice system at large, it is fair to characterize the Court’s approach 
to the right to effective assistance of counsel in Strickland as fundamentally 
wanting.  Strickland in fact has been subject to withering criticism by scholars.  
Scholars have argued that Strickland has created an almost “insurmountable 
hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance”286 and has “foster[ed] 
tolerance of abysmal lawyering.”287  Indeed, they have lamented “the degree of 
Strickland’s damage to the rule of law, expressed in doctrines carefully 
developed over years, the quantity of unjust, even fatal, consequences fostered 
in individual cases, and the disservice done to the very essence of the 
relationship between attorney and client. . . .”288 
Some of this criticism has been directed toward Strickland’s performance 
prong.  Scholars have criticized this aspect of the Strickland analysis for failing 
to inquire ex ante whether “the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as 
effectively as the prosecution,”289 improperly emphasizing conduct sufficient 
with “prevailing professional norms,” 290 and unsoundly creating the “strong 
presumption” of counsel’s reasonableness.291 
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Much criticism has also been directed toward Strickland’s prejudice 
requirement.  Scholars have criticized this aspect of the Strickland analysis for 
overemphasizing innocence292 and sacrificing the means of procedural 
safeguards for the ends of reliable trials.293  They have noted that ironically the 
prejudice prong is perhaps the most difficult to show in the very cases where 
counsel’s conduct was the most egregious294 and have argued that, by allowing 
reviewing court’s to deny relief without ever assessing counsel’s 
performance,295 it disserves the public and the legal profession by failing to 
provide clear examples of unacceptable lawyering and not making “clear that 
such shoddy performances will not be ignored or glossed over.”296  Finally, 
some scholars have noted that the difficulties presented by the prejudice prong 
are heightened in capital cases because the determination of sentence involves 
the jury’s subjective judgments, an exercise difficult to replicate on appeal 
based on a cold record.297  They have also observed that reviewing courts often 
tend to conflate the guilt and punishment phases by mischaracterizing the 
purpose of mitigating evidence and misapplying the standard for showing 
ineffective assistance during the punishment phase.298  Some have gone so far 
as to argue that Strickland produces arbitrary reviews in capital cases, 
contravening the Eighth Amendment.299 
It bears noting that while there certainly are external factors, such as 
inadequate funding, crushing workloads and lack of resources, that contribute 
to the crisis in the defense function, the doctrinal framework set forth in 
Strickland has a role in explaining even these problems.  For example, the 
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absence of ex ante, meaningful guidance about the specific obligations of 
counsel combined with the powerful presumptions of competence and 
reasonableness have allowed jurisdictions to severely under-fund defense 
systems.  Had Strickland imposed more robust obligations on counsel, 
jurisdictions would have been compelled to provide more adequate funding or 
face the prospect of appellate courts reversing convictions. 
Perhaps recognizing the continuing widespread inadequate assistance 
being provided to indigent defendants, particularly in capital cases, the 
Supreme Court in recent years has taken a more robust approach to the 
performance prong of the Strickland test.  First, the Court held in Williams v. 
Taylor that the defendant’s attorney had provided constitutionally deficient 
assistance in failing to adequately prepare for the defendant’s death penalty 
sentencing hearing.300  In an opinion authored by Justice O’Connor, who had 
authored the majority opinion in Strickland that was rather dismissive of the 
ABA Standards, the Court cited to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice in 
emphasizing counsel’s duty to conduct an independent and adequate 
investigation.301 
Three years later, in Wiggins v. Smith, the Court once again found that an 
attorney had provided constitutionally deficient assistance.302  Here too the 
Court embraced the ABA Standards in determining the inadequacy of the 
attorney’s investigation and preparation for the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial.303  Soon thereafter, in Rompilla v. Beard, the Court also found that a 
capital defendant’s attorney had provided deficient assistance by failing to 
adequately investigate and present evidence at the penalty phase 
proceedings.304  As in the prior cases, the Court repeatedly looked to the ABA 
Standards in evaluating counsel’s performance.305  As some scholars have 
surmised, these cases perhaps mark the Court’s willingness to re-visit the 
standards-based approach suggested by Justice Marshall in his prescient 
dissenting opinion in Strickland v. Washington.306 
 
 300. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 301. Id. at 396. 
 302. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 305. Id. at 387. 
 306. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706–09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See also 
John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, 
Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (2007) (observing that the Court might be 
moving towards adopting the standards-based approach suggested by Judge Bazelon of the D.C. 
Circuit Court in 1973). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] CHRONICALLY STRICKEN 395 
CONCLUSION 
Pervasive inadequate representation by counsel has rendered practically 
meaningless a critical constitutional safeguard of individual liberty.  It has also 
contributed to the conviction of innocent persons and the accompanying failure 
to convict the actual perpetrators, persons who remain free to commit 
additional crimes and whose continued liberty undermines efforts to deter 
crime.  While these problems prevailed before the Court recognized a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, they have continued to 
plague society unabated.  Indeed, it has been painfully clear that the doctrinal 
framework created by the Court in Strickland v. Washington has in important 
ways exacerbated these problems.  The twenty-fifth anniversary of Strickland 
marks an opportune time for the Court to revisit its effective assistance of 
counsel jurisprudence and remedy its deficiencies by disentangling and re-
framing the right to effective assistance of counsel.307 
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